Occupational Fraud Hides in the Gaps Between Trust and Controls

A business can have honest people, a respected finance leader, and a payment process that leaves too much to chance. The weakness starts when confidence in someone's character becomes the reason nobody independently checks their work.
For a mid-market company, that's an uncomfortable distinction. A lean finance team often carries responsibilities that grew faster than its staffing. The person who knows the suppliers may also maintain their bank details, prepare the payments, and explain the bank reconciliation. Each duty seems reasonable alone. Together, they let one person move money and conceal where it went.
This year's International Fraud Awareness Week, run by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), falls on November 15 to 21, 2026. It's a useful prompt to examine trust and controls before a missing payment forces the question. The ACFE released the 14th edition of Occupational Fraud 2026: A Report to the Nations earlier this year. It examines 2,402 cases from 143 countries and territories, and it defines occupational fraud as fraud committed by a person against the organization they work for.
What Occupational Fraud Costs When Nobody Is Checking
Start with scale. The median loss per case was $104,000 (all dollar figures here are U.S. dollars). The average was $1,457,000, because 20% of cases topped $1 million. The examiners who supplied the cases estimate that organizations lose 5% of revenue to fraud each year. Theft is the common form. Asset misappropriation appeared in 90% of cases and carried the lowest median loss of the three main categories at $100,000, but its frequency makes it the form most leaders will face.
Time drives the damage. The median scheme ran 12 months before anyone caught it. One-third of frauds were caught within 6 months, at a median loss of $40,000. The 5% that lasted more than 5 years carried a median loss of $1.115 million.
Controls explain most of it. A lack of internal controls was the main weakness in 33% of cases, an override of existing controls in 19%, and a lack of management review in 18%. Together those three account for 70%. Organizations with fewer than 100 employees had the highest median loss at $126,000, just ahead of the largest organizations at $123,000, and a loss that size weighs more where it's a bigger share of revenue. These are cases investigated by examiners, and the report itself says the data doesn't represent the full universe of incidents worldwide. Read the figures as a map of exposure, not a forecast of your losses.
Why Trust Becomes the Control in Mid-Market Companies
Mid-market finance teams tend to outgrow their control design. A company adds revenue, vendors, and locations. It rarely adds a second reviewer for the same tasks. Early hires prove reliable, so the company gives them more access, and reliability starts to replace review.
The ACFE doesn't isolate mid-market companies, so that link is my reading and not a finding. The report's pattern supports it, though. Among organizations with fewer than 100 employees, 41% had management review, against 79% of larger ones. Proactive data monitoring ran 17% against 58%, and surprise audits 16% against 52%. Those smaller organizations also saw billing schemes in 28% of cases, against 18% at larger ones, and check and payment tampering in 18%, against 8%.
Authority and tenure raise the stakes. Owners and executives caused a median loss of $475,000, more than 9 times the $50,000 for employees, and fraudsters with more than 10 years at the organization caused a median loss of $200,000. The behavioral red flags read like a profile of a trusted insider. Cases where the perpetrator refused to take vacations carried a median loss of $250,000. Cases where the perpetrator was unusually close with a vendor or customer reached $300,000.
Most people who fit that description are honest. Karen Chang, Director of the Serious Fraud Office in New Zealand, makes the point in her office's release, SFO helping NZ businesses against fraud and corruption. "Very few employees become an insider threat, but they could do disproportionate damage." A sound control system doesn't need to know which ones will. Trust and controls also serve different purposes. Trust supports working relationships and delegated responsibility. Controls create evidence that transactions were legitimate, authorized, and recorded correctly.
How Payment Diversion Slips Through One Set of Hands
Payment diversion needs very little. One person can add a vendor, change its bank details, approve the invoice, and release the payment. The ACFE puts billing schemes, 21% of cases at a $90,000 median, and check and payment tampering, 10% of cases at $114,000, among the schemes that combine frequency and cost most dangerously.
The Serious Fraud Office describes the outside version in its guidance, Mandate fraud, where someone deceives an organization into changing payment details so funds flow to a new account. It notes that the inside knowledge behind such schemes can come from corrupt employees. The two categories overlap but aren't interchangeable, and the ACFE figures cover employees defrauding their employer, not every diverted payment.
Approval has to mean something. A second signature does little if the second approver sees only an amount and a supplier name. A meaningful reviewer can examine the underlying obligation and verify where the money is going. The same logic applies to payroll changes, customer refunds and credit notes, and inventory write-offs. Four duties need different hands:
Vendor setup and changes to vendor bank details
Invoice approval
Payment release
Bank reconciliation
Verification is the control that stops diversion. Rebecca Warren, Executive General Manager Small Business Banking at the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, advised in a 2024 article on small business scams, CBA cautions small business against “too good to be true” investment opportunities, that businesses check large payments with the beneficiary in person or through a verified number, especially when the beneficiary asks to change banking details. "No single person should be responsible for making payments." The Serious Fraud Office guidance agrees on method. Contact the supplier using records already on file, not the channel that requested the change, and require two people to sign off payments above a set threshold.
Record who verified a change, when, and who approved it. The control also has to reach the next payment, so whoever releases funds can see that the destination changed recently and was verified. A monthly reconciliation can reveal a diversion only after the money has left. For high-value payments and changed beneficiaries, verify before release.
Controls That Work When the Team Is Small
Small teams can't always staff four roles, and they don't have to. The goal is to decide where independence matters most and cover the rest with review. Someone outside payment preparation, such as the owner, the CEO, or a board member, should receive the bank statements directly and review reconciliations against source records. A separate approver should examine every new supplier and every banking change before payment, and an outside accountant can inspect selected transactions on a schedule.
Review needs enough detail to be real. A signed cover sheet saying management looked at the payments tells you little if nobody can say what was checked, which exceptions turned up, and how they were resolved. The data shows why the effort pays. Management review was associated with median losses 55% lower, proactive data monitoring 53% lower, and surprise audits 50% lower. Surprise audits also cut the median duration from 16 months to 8.
Add one human control. Finance staff should take 2 consecutive weeks away each year, with someone else running their duties. Job rotation and mandatory vacation were in place at only 27% of victim organizations, yet they were associated with 49% lower median losses and a median duration of 8 months instead of 12.
Collusion is the limit of separation. Frauds by 3 or more perpetrators caused a median loss of $324,000, against $55,000 for a single perpetrator, and two people working together can defeat a control built around two people. Detection matters as much as design. Tips uncovered 43% of cases, and 55% of those tips came from employees, yet only 24% of organizations with fewer than 100 employees had a hotline, against 85% of larger ones. The channel has to work when the concern involves someone in finance or senior management, which might mean an independent director or an owner outside the reporting line. Leaders decide whether people use it. If an employee is criticized for delaying a suspicious payment, the next one learns that speed outranks verification. Thank people who raise concerns, even when the concern proves innocent. Banking practice and audit rules vary by country, so confirm what applies to you before you copy these steps.
Seniority Must Not Create an Exemption
Controls turn fragile when employees must follow them and senior leaders can bypass them through urgency or status. An instruction from the owner can pressure an approver into not asking for evidence. If your own approval can override a control, you don't have a control. In frauds by owners and executives, poor tone at the top was the third most common weakness, cited in 20% of cases, and only 52% of those perpetrators were terminated, against 75% of employees. Emergency payments need a defined route, an alternate approver, and a record of the exception. Otherwise your busiest period becomes the time your protections are least dependable.
Independent checks protect employees too. They relieve a trusted colleague who would otherwise become the sole explanation for an irregularity, and they give someone facing an unusual instruction a process to rely on instead of a personal confrontation with a powerful requester. In the same release, Karen Chang says fraud and corruption can cost businesses money, stress their staff, and damage their reputations. An anomaly isn't proof of dishonesty. Duplicate bank details, unexplained adjustments, and repeated exceptions deserve proportionate review, with confidentiality and fair treatment.
Finance Function Design Is a Leadership Decision
Segregation of duties isn't an accounting formality. It decides who in your company can move money alone, and that's a leadership call. A finance function designed for a company half your size may no longer hold. Fast growth, an acquisition, or a new payment process can each open a gap without anyone choosing to open one. Design the roles on purpose and revisit them when the business changes shape.
Use Fraud Week to trace one recent supplier payment from obligation to approval, beneficiary verification, bank release, and reconciliation. Then trace one involving changed bank details or an urgent exception, because a process that works only for routine payments leaves its hardest judgment to the moment of greatest pressure. Ask four questions. Who can change vendor bank details? Does someone with no payment authority reconcile the bank? Can anyone initiate, process, and reconcile a transaction alone? Does your reporting channel work when the concern involves a senior leader? Then write the name of the person responsible for each of the four duties. If one name appears twice, you've found your first gap. If your own name appears, you've found a second.
Pick one repair, assign an owner and a date, and check that the new process works in practice. A company should be able to rely on its people without making their integrity its only protection.
When Growth Outpaces the Finance Function
When growth, transition, or performance pressure stretches an organization's existing ways of working, Aspirations Consulting Group helps leaders connect financial discipline, operating responsibilities, and strategic priorities so the business can move forward with greater clarity.
Finance Strategy That Outlasts Fraud Week
Request a complimentary subscription to ACG Strategic Insights™, the weekday publication that reaches more than 10 million current and aspiring executives and other leaders worldwide.
Thanks for reading!
~ Jerry Justice
Living to Serve, Serving to Lead™




Comments